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[Shannon, 1948] (for a binary symmetric channel of error rate p):
Decoding probability −→ 1 if
k
n
= R < 1− h(p)
(h(p) = −p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p) the binary entropy function)
Codes of rate R can correct up to λn errors (λ = h−1(1−R))
For instance 11% of errors for R = 0.5
Non constructive −→ no poly-time algorithm for decoding in general
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Random Codes Are Hard to Decode
When the linear expansion is random:
• Decoding is NP-complete [Berlekamp, McEliece & van Tilborg,
78]
• Even the tiniest amount of error is (believed to be) hard to re-
move. Decoding nε errors is conjectured difficult on average for
any ε > 0 [Alekhnovich, 2003].
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Codes with Good Decoders Exist
Coding theory is about finding “good” codes (i.e. linear expansions)






• some classes of codes have a poly-time decoder for O(n) errors
(algebraic geometry, expander graphs, concatenation, . . . )
N. Sendrier – Code-Based Public-Key Cryptography 3/58












• If a random linear code is used, no one can decode efficiently
• If a “good” code is used, anyone who knows the structure has
access to a fast decoder
Assuming that the knowledge of the linear expansion does not reveal
the code structure:
• The linear expansion is public and anyone can encrypt
• The decoder is known to the legitimate user who can decrypt
• For anyone else, the code looks random
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Why Consider Code-Based Cryptography?
Because
• it’s always good to understand more things
• cryptography needs diversity to evolve against
• quantum computing
• algorithmic progress
• we can do it
→ that’s what this lecture is about
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I. Introduction to Codes and
Code-based Cryptography
Notations
Fq the finite field with q elements
Hamming distance: x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fnq , y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Fnq
dist(x, y) = |{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | xi 6= yi}|
Hamming weight: x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fnq ,
wt(x) = |{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | xi 6= 0}| = dist(x, 0)
Sn(0, t) = {e ∈ Fnq | wt(e) = t}
(the sphere, in the Hamming space Fnq , centered in 0 of radius t)
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Linear Error Correcting Codes
A q-ary linear [n, k] code C is a k-dimensional subspace of Fnq
A generator matrix G ∈ Fk×nq of C is such that C =
{
xG | x ∈ Fkq
}





The encoding can be inverted by multiplying a word of C by a right
inverse G∗ of G: if GG∗ = Id then fG(x)G
∗ = xGG∗ = x
If G is in systematic form, G = (Id | R) then G∗ = (Id | 0)T is a right
inverse and the de-encoding consists in truncating
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Parity Check Matrix and Syndrome
Let C be a q-ary linear [n, k] code, let r = n− k
A parity check matrix H ∈ Fr×nq of C is such that C =
{
x ∈ Fnq | xHT = 0
}
The H-syndrome (or syndrome) of y ∈ Fnq is SH(y) = yHT
For all y ∈ Fnq , let s = yHT , the coset of y is defined as
Coset(y) = y + C = {z ∈ Fnq | zHT = yHT = s} = S−1H (s)
The cosets form a partition of the space Fnq
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Decoding and Syndrome Decoding
Let C be a q-ary linear [n, k] code, let H be a parity check matrix of C
• ΦC : Fnq → C is a t-bounded decoder if for all x ∈ C and all e ∈ Fnq
wt(e) ≤ t⇒ ΦC(x+ e) = x
• ΨH : Fn−kq → Fnq is a t-bounded H-syndrome decoder if for all
e ∈ Fnq
wt(e) ≤ t⇒ ΨH(eHT ) = e
∃ an efficient
t-bounded decoder
⇔ ∃ an efficient
t-bounded syndrome decoder
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McEliece Public-key Encryption Scheme – Overview
Let C be a binary linear [n, k] code
Public key: a generator matrix G ∈ {0,1}k×n of C
C =
{
xG | x ∈ {0,1}k
}
Secret key: a t-bounded decoder Φ : {0,1}n → C for C
Encryption:
 EG : {0,1}k → {0,1}n
x 7→ xG+ e
 with e random of weight t
Decryption:
 DΦ : {0,1}n → {0,1}k
y 7→ Φ(y)G∗
 where GG∗ = 1
Proof: DΦ(EG(x)) = DΦ(xG+ e) = Φ(xG+ e)G
∗ = xGG∗ = x
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Niederreiter Public-key Encryption Scheme – Overview
Let C be a binary linear [n, k] code, r = n− k
Public key: a parity check matrix H ∈ {0,1}r×n of C
C =
{
x ∈ {0,1}n | xHT = 0
}
Secret key: a t-bounded H-syndrome decoder Ψ : {0,1}r → {0,1}n
Encryption:




 DΨ : {0,1}r → Sn(0, t)
s 7→ Ψ(s)

Proof: DΨ(EH(e)) = DΨ(eH
T ) = e
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McEliece/Niederreiter Security
The following two problems must be difficult enough:
1. Retrieve an efficient t-bounded decoder from the public key (i.e.
a generator matrix or a parity check matrix)
The legitimate user must be able to decode thus some structure
exists, it must remain hidden to the adversary
2. Decode t errors in a random binary [n, k] code
Without knowledge of the trapdoor the adversary is reduced to
use generic decoding techniques
The parameters n, k and t must be chosen large enough
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In Practice
[McEliece, 1978]
“A public-key cryptosystem based on algebraic coding theory”
The secret code was an irreducible binary Goppa code of length 1024,
dimension 524 correcting up to 50 errors
• public key size: 536 576 bits
• cleartext size: 524 bits
• ciphertext size: 1024 bits
A bit undersized today (attacked in [Bernstein, Lange, & Peters, 08]
with ≈ 260 CPU cycles)
[Niederreiter, 1986]
“Knapsack-type cryptosystems and algebraic coding theory”
Several families of secret codes were proposed, among them Reed-
Solomon codes, concatenated codes and Goppa codes. Only Goppa
codes are secure today.
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II. Instantiating McEliece
Which Code Family ?
Finding families of codes whose structure cannot be recognized seems
to be a difficult task
Family Proposed by Broken by
Goppa McEliece (78) -
Reed-Solomon Niederreiter (86) Sidelnikov & Chestakov (92)
Concatenated Niederreiter (86) S. (98)
Reed-Muller Sidelnikov (94) Minder & Shokrollahi (07)
AG codes Janwa & Moreno (96) Faure & Minder (08)
Couvreur, Márquez-Corbella.
& Pellikaan (14)
LDPC Monico, Rosenthal, & Shokrollahi (00)
Convolutional Löndahl & Landais & Tillich (13)
codes Johansson (12)
[Faugère, Gauthier, Otmani, Perret, & Tillich, 11] distinguisher for
binary Goppa codes of rate → 1
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More on Goppa Codes
Goppa codes are not limited to the binary case. It is possible to define
q-ary Goppa codes with a support in Fqm.
[Bernstein, Lange, & Peters, 10]: Wild McEliece. The key size can
be reduced in some case. There are limits:
• [Couvreur, Otmani, & Tillich, 14] Choose m > 2
• [Faugère, Perret, & Portzamparc, 14] Caution if q not prime
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Reducing the Public Key Size
In a block-circulant matrix, each (square) block is completely defined
by its first row → public key size is linear instead of quadratic
• Quasi-cyclic [Gaborit, 05] or quasi-dyadic [Misoczki & Barreto,
09] alternant (Goppa) codes. Structure + structure must be
used with great care [Faugère, Otmani, Perret, & Tillich, 10]
• Disguised QC-LDPC codes [Baldi & Chiaraluce, 07]. New promis-
ing trend.
• QC-MDPC [Misoczki, Tillich, S., & Barreto, 13]. As above with
a stronger security reduction.
N. Sendrier – Code-Based Public-Key Cryptography 17/58
Irreducible Binary Goppa Codes
Parameters: m, t and n ≤ 2m
Support: L = (α1, . . . , αn) distinct in F2m
Generator: g(z) ∈ F2m[z] monic irreducible of degree t










The binary irreducible Goppa code Γ(L, g) is defined by
a ∈ Γ(L, g)⇔ Ra(z) = 0 mod g(z).




σe(z) mod g(z). (1)
Given Re(z), the key equation (1) can be solved in σe(z) if wt(e) ≤ t
providing a poly-time t-bounded decoder.
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Some Sets of Parameters for Goppa Codes
text size in bits
McEliece Niederreiter key message
m, t cipher clear cipher clear size security∗
10,50 1024 524 500 284 32 kB 52
11,40 2048 1608 440 280 88 kB 81
12,50 4096 3496 600 385 277 kB 120
∗ logarithm in base 2 of the cost of the best known attack
lower bound derived from ISD, BJMM variant (generic decoder)
the key security is always higher (≈ mt)
key size is given for a key in systematic form
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Some Sets of Parameters for QC-MDPC-McEliece
Binary QC-MDPC [n, k] code with parity check equations of weight
w correcting t errors
size in bits security∗
(n, k, w, t) cipher clear key message key
(9602,4801,90,84) 9602 4801 4801 80 79
(19714,9857,142,134) 19714 9857 9857 128 129
∗ logarithm in base 2 of the cost of the best known attack
lower bound derived from ISD, BJMM variant
The best key attack and the best message attack are both based on
generic decoding
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III. Security Reduction to
Difficult Problems
Hard Decoding Problems
[Berlekamp, McEliece, & van Tilborg, 78]
Syndrome Decoding NP-complete
Instance: H ∈ {0,1}r×n, s ∈ {0,1}r, w integer
Question: Is there e ∈ {0,1}n such that wt(e) ≤ w and eHT = s?
Computational Syndrome Decoding NP-hard
Instance: H ∈ {0,1}r×n, s ∈ {0,1}r, w integer
Output: e ∈ {0,1}n such that wt(e) ≤ w and eHT = s
[Finiasz, 04]
Goppa Bounded Decoding NP-hard
Instance: H ∈ {0,1}r×n, s ∈ {0,1}r
Output: e ∈ {0,1}n such that wt(e) ≤
r
log2 n
and eHT = s
Open problem: average case complexity (Conjectured difficult)
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Hard Structural Problems
Goppa code Distinguishing NP
Instance: G ∈ {0,1}k×n
Question: Does G span a binary Goppa code?
• NP: the property is easy to check given (L, g)
• Completeness status is unknown
• Easy when the information rate → 1
(Faugère, Gauthier, Otmani, Perret, & Tillich, 11)
Goppa code Reconstruction
Instance: G ∈ {0,1}k×n
Output: (L, g) such that Γ(L, g) =
{
xG | x ∈ Fkq
}
• Tightness: gap between decisional and computational problems
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Decoders and Distinguishers
For given parameters n, k, and t
Let G ⊂ K ⊂ {0,1}k×n, where G is the public key space and K the
apparent public key space. (in the original scheme, G is the set of all
generator matrices of a Goppa code and K = {0,1}k×n)
For quasi-cyclic variants, the apparent key space K is limited to block-
circulant matrices.
We consider two programs
• a decoding algorithm: A : {0,1}n × {0,1}k×n → Sn(0, t)
• a distinguisher: D : {0,1}k×n → {true, false}
We consider the sample space Ω = {0,1}k×{0,1}k×n×Sn(0, t) equipped
with the uniform distribution, and the event (successful decoding)
SA = {(x,G, e) ∈ Ω | A(xG+ e,G) = e}
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Decoders and Distinguishers (continued)
K the apparent public key space A : {0,1}n × {0,1}k×n → Sn(0, t)
G the (real) public key space D : {0,1}k×n → {true, false}
—
A is a (T, ε)-decoder (generic for K) if
• running time: |A| ≤ T
• success probability: SuccDec(A) = PrΩ(SA | G ∈ K) ≥ ε
A is a (T, ε)-adversary (against McEliece) if
• running time: |A| ≤ T
• success probability: SuccMcE(A) = PrΩ(SA | G ∈ G) ≥ ε
D is a (T, ε)-distinguisher (for G against K) if
• running time: |D| ≤ T
• advantage:
Adv(D) =
∣∣∣PrΩ(D(G) | G ∈ K)− PrΩ(D(G) | G ∈ G)∣∣∣ ≥ ε
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Security Reduction for McEliece
Theorem
If there exists a (T, ε)-adversary then there exists either
• a (T, ε/2)-decoder (for K),
• or a (T +O(n2), ε/2)-distinguisher (for G against K),
Proof (hint):
D(G):
x← {0,1}k ; e← Sn(0, t) // randomly and uniformly
return A(xG+ e,G) ?= e
The result holds also for the Niederreiter scheme and for any real and
apparent public key spaces G and K. For quasi-cyclic variants, the
apparent key space K is limited to block-circulant matrices.
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One Way Encryption Schemes
A scheme is OWE (One Way Encryption) if the all attacks are in-
tractable on average when the messages and the keys are uniformly
distributed
Loosely speaking, there is no (T, ε)-adversary with T/ε upper bounded
by a polynomial in the system parameters
Assuming
• decoding in a random linear code is hard
• Goppa codes are pseudorandom
McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems are One Way Encryption
(OWE) schemes
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Malleability attack
[folklore]
You intercept a ciphertext y corresponding to an unknown message x
(i.e. y = xG+ e)
You choose a codeword a and you transmit y + a which is a valid
ciphertext for some unknown cleartext different from x
This is not a desirable feature, a priori...
N. Sendrier – Code-Based Public-Key Cryptography 27/58
Resend-message Attack
[Berson, 97]
The same message x is sent twice with the same key G
Adding the two ciphertexts y1 = xG+ e1 and y2 = xG+ e2 we obtain
y1 + y2 = e1 + e2
The word e1+e2 will have a weight ρ = 2(t−ν) where ν is the number
of overlapping non-zero positions in e1 and e2
In practice ν is small (2.5 on average with the original McEliece param-
eters) and we know all but ν of the error positions in the ciphertexts
Removing the ν remaining errors is a simple matter
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Reaction Attack
[Kobara & Imai, 00] ??
In this attack, we assume the system can be used as an oracle in the
following sense:
• If the system receives a word at distance > t from the code it
answers “invalid ciphertext”
• If the system receives a word at distance ≤ t from the code it
behaves otherwise (for instance, it proceeds with the protocol)
Given a ciphertext y we transform it into a word y′ by flipping the i-th
bit. If i was an error position y′ is at distance t − 1 from the code,
else it is at distance t + 1. We submit y′ and from the answer we
know whether or not i was an error position.
We try this for every position and we retrieve the error pattern
In fact this is a proof that there is no gap between “Decisional Syn-
drome Decoding” and “Computational Syndrome Decoding”
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Semantically Secure Conversions
Being OWE is a very weak notion of security. In the case of code-
based systems, it does not encompass attacks such that the “resend-
message attack”, the “reaction attack” or, more generally, attacks
related to malleability.
Fortunately, using the proper semantically secure conversion any de-
terministic OWE scheme can become IND-CCA2, the strongest se-
curity notion.
McEliece is not deterministic but IND-CCA2 conversion are possible
nevertheless, see [Kobara & Imai, 01] for the first one.
An IND-CPA conversion without random oracle also exists [Nojima,
Imai, Kobara & Morozov, 08].
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IV. Implementation
A Remark on Niederreiter Encryption Scheme
In Niederreiter’s system the encryption procedure is:
EH : Sn(0, t) → {0,1}r
e 7→ eHT
The set Sn(0, t) is not very convenient to manipulate data, we would
rather have an injective mapping
ϕ : {0,1}` → Sn(0, t)





but as close as possible. In addition, we need ϕ and
ϕ−1 to have a fast implementation.
In that case the encryption becomes EH◦ϕ and the decryption ϕ−1◦DΨ
Note that ϕ is also required for the semantically secure conversions
of McEliece as we must “mix” the error with the message
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Constant Weight Words Encoding - Combinatorial Solution
[Schalkwijk, 72]
We represent a word of Sn(0, t) by the indexes of its non-zero co-
ordinates 0 ≤ i1 < i2 < . . . < it < n and we define the one-to-one
mapping






















This mapping can be inverted by using the formula [S. 02]















bits in one word of Sn(0, t)
The cost in quadratic in `
N. Sendrier – Code-Based Public-Key Cryptography 32/58
Constant Weight Words Encoding - Source Coding Solutions
Another approach is to use source coding. We try to find an ap-
proximative models for constant weight words which are simpler to
encode.
It is possible to design fast (linear time) methods with a minimal loss
(one or very few bits per block)
• fastest → variable length encoding
• fast → constant length encoding (implemented in HyMES)
Still not negligible compared to the encryption cost
Regular word (used in code-based hash function FSB) is an extreme
example with a very high speed but a big information loss (the model
for generating constant weight words is very crude)
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Deterministic Version of McEliece
Hybrid McEliece encryption scheme (HyMES) [Biswas & S., 08]
Parameters: m, t, n = 2m, ϕ : {0,1}` → Sn(0, t)
Secret key: an irreducible binary Goppa code Γ(L, g)
ΦL,g a t-bounded decoder
Public key: a systematic generator matrix G = (Id | R) of Γ(L, g)
Encryption:
 ER : {0,1}k × {0,1}` → {0,1}n
(x, x′) 7→ (x, xR) + ϕ(x′)

Decryption:
 DL,g : {0,1}n → {0,1}k × {0,1}`
y 7→ (x, x′)

where (x, ∗) = ΦL,g(y) and x′ = ϕ−1(y −ΦL,g(y))
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Security of Hybrid McEliece
• Using the error for encoding information
No security loss!





• Using a systematic generator matrix
The system remains OWE, puzzling but true!
cleartext: x
ciphertext: (x, xR) + e with e of small weight
No change in security, but there is a need for a semantically secure
layer (as for the original system)
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Conversion for Semantic Security – OAEP
[Bellare & Rogaway, 94]
(rnd) (0 · · ·0)yx
y ⊕ f(x)x











 a = x⊕ h(y ⊕ f(x))b = y ⊕ f(x) ⇔
 x = a⊕ h(b)y = b⊕ f(a⊕ h(b))
Under the “random oracle assumption” on f and h this conversion
provides semantic security (non malleability and indistinguishability).
N. Sendrier – Code-Based Public-Key Cryptography 36/58
Encryption/Decryption Speed
sizes cycles/byte cycles/block
m, t cipher clear encrypt decrypt encrypt decrypt security
11,40 2048 1888 105 800 25K 189K 81
12,50 4096 3881 98 618 47K 300K 120
(Intel Xeon 3.4Ghz, single processor) 100 Kcycle ≈ 30 µs
AES: 10-20 cycles/byte
McBits [Berstein, Chou, & Schwabe] gains a factor ≈ 5 on decoding
(bit-sliced field arithmetic + algorithmic innovations for decoding).
Targets key exchange mechanism based on Niederreiter.
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V. Practical Security - The
Attacks
Best Known Attacks
Decoding attacks. For the public-key encryption schemes the best
attack is always Information Set Decoding (ISD), this will change
for other cryptosystems
Key attacks. Most proposals using families other than binary Goppa
codes have been broken
For binary Goppa codes there are only exhaustive attacks enumer-
ating either generator polynomials either supports (that is permu-
tations)
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Syndrome Decoding – Problem Statement
Computational Syndrome Decoding
CSD(n, r, w)
Given H ∈ {0,1}r×n and s ∈ {0,1}r, solve eHT = s with wt(e) ≤ w
e = Hamming weight w






Find w columns of H adding to s






→ computing effort > 280
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Algorithm 0


















1 addition or weight computation
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Algorithm 1: Birthday Decoding
H =
w/2 w/2
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Algorithm 2: Information Set Decoding [Prange, 1962]
Big difference with subset sums: one can use linear algebra
UHP = Us =
-









Repeat for several permutation matrices P












Total cost: ≈ rn(n/r)w column operations
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Algorithm 2’: ISD [Lee & Brickell, 1988]
Idea: amortize the Gaussian elimination
UHP = H ′ Us =
-






w − p p
1
1
Repeat for several permutation matrices P

























, only a polynomial gain
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Generalized Information Set Decoding
[Stern, 89] ; [Dumer, 91]


















1. Permutation + partial Gaussian elimination
2. Find many e′ such that H ′e′ = s′
3. For all good e′, test wt(s′′+H ′′e′) ≤ w − p
Step 3. is (a kind of) Lee & Brickell which embeds Step 2
Step 2. is Birthday Decoding (or whatever is best)
Total cost is minimized over ` and p
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Generalized Information Set Decoding
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Generalized Information Set Decoding – Workfactor
eP =




















































) with ` = log(√(k+`p )
)
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Information Set Decoding – Timeline
• Information Set Decoding: [Prange, 62]
• Relax the weight profile: [Lee & Brickell, 88]
• Compute sums on partial columns first: [Leon, 88]
• Use the birthday attack: [Stern, 89], [Dumer, 91]
• First “real” implementation: [Canteaut & Chabaud, 98]
• Initial McEliece parameters broken: [Bernstein, Lange, & Peters, 08]
• Lower bounds: [Finiasz & S., 09]
• Ball-collision decoding [Bernstein, Lange, & Peters, 11]
• Asymptotic exponent improved [May, Meurer, & Thomae, 11]
• Decoding one out of many [S., 11]
• Even better asymptotic exponent [Becker, Joux, May, & Meurer, 12]
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Key Security
This is the main security issue in code based cryptography
• Find families of codes whose generator matrices are indistinguish-
able from random matrices
• Goppa codes: excluding a few extremal cases, Goppa codes (bi-
nary or not) seem to be pseudorandom→ best attack is essentially
an exhaustive search
We assume it is true, do we have better arguments?
• Can we find quasi-cyclic families which are indistinguishable?
QC-MDPC is an answer to some extent. Can we do better?
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Conclusion for Public Key Encryption
• Good security reduction
partly heuristic though:
– nothing proven on the average case complexity of decoding
– indistinguishability assumptions need more attention
• The best attacks are decoding attacks
→ generic decoding is an essential long term research topic (in-
cluding with quantum algorithms)
• Open problems are mainly related to the key security
– find other good families of codes
– safely reduce the public key size
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VI. Other Public Key Systems
Other Public Key Systems
• Digital Signature, [Courtois, Finiasz & S., 01]
Same kind security reduction:
Hardness of decoding & Indistinguishability of Goppa codes
• Zero Knowledge identification
[Stern, 93], [Véron, 95], [Gaborit & Girault, 07]
Much stronger security reduction: Hardness of decoding only
• And also. . .
ID based signature [Cayrel, Gaborit & Girault, 07]
Threshold ring signature [Aguilar-Melchor, Cayrel & Gaborit, 08],
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CFS Digital Signature
H ∈ {0,1}r×n a parity check matrix of a t-error correcting Goppa code
Signing: the message M is given
• Hash the text M into a binary word h(M) = s ∈ {0,1}r
• Find e of minimal weight such that eHT = s
• Use e as a signature
Verifying: M and e are given
• Hash the text M into a binary word h(M) = s ∈ {0,1}r
• Check eHT = s
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CFS Digital Signature – Not so Easy
In practice n = 2m = 216, t = 9 and r = n− k = tm = 144
The public key H has size 144× 65536 (≈ 1.2 MB)
Let s ∈R {0,1}144, let w be the minimal weight of e such that s = eHT
• w ≤ 9 with probability ≈ 3 10−6 (in general w ≤ t with prob. 1/t!)
• w = 10 with probability ≈ 10−2
• w = 11 with probability ≈ 1− 10−46







• the trapdoor only allows the correction of t = 9 errors
• we need to decode 11 errors → we have to guess 2 error positions
• requires t! = 362880 decoding attempts on average
The legitimate user has to pay ≈ 233 while the attacker has to pay
> 277
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CFS Digital Signature – Scalability
Binary Goppa code of length n = 2m correcting t errors
The public key H ∈ {0,1}r×n (where r = tm is the codimension)
Signature cost t!O(m2t2)
Signature length tm− log2(t!)
Verification cost O(mt2)
Public key size tm2m
Security bits 12tm
• The signature cost is exponential in t
• The key size is exponential in m
• The security is exponential in tm
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CFS Digital Signature – Decoding One Out of Many
Bleichenbacher’s “Decoding One Out of Many”-type attack (2003 or
2004, unpublished) reduces the security to 13tm
[Finiasz, 10] Parallel-CFS: sign several related syndrome.
• take a (λ times) longer hash of the message h(M) = (s1, ..., sλ)
• sign all λ syndromes → security back to 12tm
• λ must be 3 or 4 (do not need to grow with the security parameter)
Signature length & cost and verification cost all multiplied by λ
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CFS Digital Signature – Implementation
• [Landais & S., 12] Software implementation of parallel-CFS
(m, t) = (20,8), λ = 3 → 80 bits security
Key size: 20 MB, one signature in ≈ 1.5 seconds
• [+ Schwabe] bit-sliced field arithmetic → 100 milliseconds for one
signature
An important security issue: binary Goppa codes of rate → 1 are not
pseudorandom (no attack, but no security reduction either)
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Stern ZK Authentication Protocol
Parameters: H ∈ {0,1}r×n, weight w > 0, commitment scheme c(·)
Secret: some word e of weight w (w ≈ Gilbert-Varshamov distance)















A0 = y, σ
A1 = (y + e), σ
A2 = σ(y), σ(e)
Check:

if b = 0 check c1 and c2
if b = 1 check c0 and c2
if b = 2 check c0 and c1 (and wt(σ(e)) = w)
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Stern ZK Authentication Protocol – Security
• An honest prover always succeeds (completeness)
• A dishonest prover succeeds for one round with probability 2/3 at
most (eventually leading to soundness)
• No information on the secret leaks (zero-knowledge)
→ For a security level S, S/log2(3/2) ≈ 1.7S rounds are needed
(80 bits security → 137 rounds, 128 bits security → 219 rounds)
→ Can be transformed into a signature (Fiat-Shamir NIZK)
→ A tight security reduction to syndrome decoding
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bi←− bi ← {0,1,2}
Answer
Abi,i−→ check commitments
• Draw σi, yi, and compute c0,i, c1,i, c2,i for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ R
• Compute x = Hash((c0,i, c1,i, c2,i)1≤i≤R)
• Draw bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ R, using a PRNG with seed x
• The signature is (Abi,i, c0,i, c1,i, c2,i)1≤i≤R
80 bits security → signature of 174 Kbits
128 bits security → signature of 445 Kbits
[Aguilar-Melchor, Gaborit, & Schrek, 11] reduced to 79 and 202 Kbits
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General Conclusions
• Code-based cryptosystems are practical, efficient, secure, versatile
. . . some of them at least
• Also symmetric schemes (hash function, stream ciphers,. . . )
• Strong features
• Hardness of decoding, tight security reductions in that respect
• Efficient algorithms: fast public key encryption
• Not so strong features
• Public key size (not necessarily a problem)
• Few code families: biodiversity would be welcome
• Main open problems
• Key security (security assumptions, families of codes, . . . )
• Key size reduction: what gain for what cost?
• Improve the digital signature
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Thank you for your attention
